> ## Content Index > Fetch the complete content index at: https://www.bexus.info/llms.txt > Use this file to discover other available public pages before exploring further. # Taiwan prosecutors indict four, including ex-soldiers who passed military secrets to China, for leaking to 'the enemy'; South Korean law, by contrast, has no espionage provision naming China - URL: https://www.bexus.info/20261020-news-48-en/ - Published: 2026-10-20T13:55:09.000Z - Updated: 2026-10-24T10:49:25.000Z - Description: Taiwan High Prosecutors Office on Oct. 19 indicted four people, including ex-soldiers, for passing classified military documents to the Chinese side for pay, citing a provision punishing leaks to the enemy with death or life in prison and seeking heavy sentences. - Author: Alfred Kim - Tags: english, 인도태평양, Indo-Pacific TAIWAN The Taiwan High Prosecutors Office (臺灣高等檢察署) on Oct. 19 (local time) indicted four people, three former soldiers and one public servant, on charges of passing classified military documents to the Chinese side in exchange for payment. The provisions cited include Article 20, Paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code of the Armed Forces, which punishes anyone who leaks or delivers military secrets to the enemy with death or life imprisonment. Prosecutors asked the court to impose heavy sentences on all four defendants. The illicit gains obtained by the four total NT$1,829,403. ## High Prosecutors Office says two ex-soldiers passed military secrets for more than a year The defendants named by the High Prosecutors Office are Li ○-da (李○達), Sen ○-zi (森○姿), Cai ○-cheng (蔡○澄) and You ○-yu (尤○宇). Li ○-da and Sen ○-zi were active-duty soldiers at the time of the offenses and have since both been discharged. The two are accused of taking money to spy on, collect, leak and deliver multiple items of classified military material for the Chinese side. According to prosecutors, Li ○-da committed the offenses from March-April 2024 (Republic of China year 113) to August 2025, and Sen ○-zi from October-November 2023 to March 2025\. Sen ○-zi began about five months earlier, and Li ○-da's offenses continued until August 2025, five months later than Sen ○-zi's. Li ○-da's illicit gains amounted to NT$884,000, and the money received by Sen ○-zi and Cai ○-cheng totaled NT$515,000 combined. Prosecutors described the material the two handed over as "足以使國家與軍事作戰安全及國防利益遭受損害之軍事機密文件" (classified military documents sufficient to damage the security of the state and of military operations and national defense interests). ## A public servant's bank account and a cryptocurrency wallet carried the payments Cai ○-cheng, who was a public servant, is accused of lending a bank account in Cai's own name so that Sen ○-zi could receive payment for the secrets handed over. You ○-yu, a discharged soldier, is accused of receiving cryptocurrency sent by a person on the Chinese side to a wallet in his name "自113年3月間至同年10月止" (from March 2024 to October of the same year). He sold the cryptocurrency to over-the-counter dealers (幣商) for cash and then, on the instructions of the person on the Chinese side, deposited it into the accounts of Li ○-da and Cai ○-cheng. Prosecutors regarded this as "掩飾、隱匿特定犯罪所得之來源" (concealing and disguising the source of proceeds of specified crimes) and also charged him with violating the Money Laundering Control Act. You ○-yu's illicit gains amounted to NT$430,403. ## Prosecutors cite cross-strait military confrontation in seeking heavy sentences for all Prosecutors noted that at the time of the case Li ○-da and Sen ○-zi were people of "國家軍人身分，肩負保家衛國之軍職" (the status of national soldiers, shouldering the military duty of defending home and country). They said Cai ○-cheng, as a public servant, should also have understood the importance of national security and social stability. Prosecutors said "現今兩岸長期處於軍事對立之緊張關係，面對大陸地區之武力威脅" (the two sides of the Strait are now in a long-standing tense relationship of military confrontation and face the threat of force from the mainland area), yet the defendants "竟為牟取私利，輕易背棄對國家之忠誠義務" (lightly abandoned their duty of loyalty to the state in pursuit of private gain). They judged that the actions of Li ○-da, Sen ○-zi and Cai ○-cheng had "影響國家安全甚鉅" (a very great impact on national security). According to prosecutors, You ○-yu, although "前因洩漏、交付機密軍事資料而遭起訴" (previously indicted for leaking and delivering classified military material), "猶接受大陸地區所新闢之管道獲取財物" (still accepted a newly opened channel from the mainland area to obtain money). Prosecutors said he played an indispensable role in completing the offenses and that after the offenses he "飾詞狡辯，毫無悔悟之心" (made excuses with embellished words and showed no remorse at all). They added: "建請法院均從重量刑，以收儆懲" (we request that the court impose heavy sentences on all, to achieve the effect of deterrence and punishment). ## Provisions cited include an article prescribing death or life imprisonment Prosecutors applied six laws: the Criminal Code of the Armed Forces, the Classified National Security Information Protection Act, the National Security Act, the Criminal Code, the Anti-Corruption Act (貪污治罪條例) and the Money Laundering Control Act. The most severe, Article 20, Paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code of the Armed Forces, provides that anyone who leaks or delivers military secrets to "敵人" (the enemy) shall be "處死刑或無期徒刑" (punished by death or life imprisonment). Paragraph 1 of the same article, which covers leaks to parties other than the enemy, carries a prison sentence of three to 10 years. Prosecutors brought the indictment treating the Chinese side as the "enemy" under this provision. Article 22, Paragraph 2 of the same law punishes anyone who spies on or collects military secrets for the enemy with five to 12 years in prison, or life imprisonment or at least seven years in prison in wartime. Article 2 of the National Security Act bars anyone from leaking, delivering, spying on or collecting classified official documents for foreign countries, the mainland area, Hong Kong and Macau, or hostile overseas forces. Article 7, Paragraph 2 punishes leaking or delivering with one to seven years in prison and allows an additional fine of up to NT$10 million, and Paragraph 3 punishes spying or collecting with six months to five years in prison and a fine of up to NT$3 million. The indictment also lists Article 32, Paragraph 2 (leaking or delivering national secrets to the mainland area) and Article 34, Paragraph 3 (spying on or collecting national secrets for the mainland area) of the Classified National Security Information Protection Act, as well as Article 109, Paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Criminal Code, covering leaking or delivering defense secrets, and Article 111, Paragraph 1, covering spying and collection. Article 4, Paragraph 1, Subparagraph 5 of the Anti-Corruption Act punishes public servants who accept bribes for acts contrary to their duties with life imprisonment or at least 10 years in prison, and allows an additional fine of up to NT$100 million. Prosecutors also applied Article 11, Paragraphs 1 and 4 of the act. Article 11, Paragraph 1 punishes anyone who bribes a public servant in return for acts contrary to their duties with one to seven years in prison, and Paragraph 4 provides the same punishment for people without public servant status who commit this offense. The latter part of Article 19, Paragraph 1 of the Money Laundering Control Act was applied. ## Investigation conducted jointly by the Investigation Bureau, Political Warfare Bureau and Military Security Command Under the direction of the High Prosecutors Office, the investigation was conducted by the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau's National Security Maintenance Station (國家安全維護工作站), the Ministry of National Defense's Political Warfare Bureau and the Military Security Command. The Investigation Bureau handles Taiwan's counterintelligence investigations, while the Political Warfare Bureau and the Military Security Command are responsible for internal military security and counterintelligence. Prosecutors stressed that "國家安全乃民主基石，本署針對任何危害國家安全案件，均秉持縝密蒐證及嚴正執法之原則" (national security is the cornerstone of democracy, and this office adheres to the principles of meticulous evidence gathering and strict law enforcement in every case endangering national security). ## Taoyuan prosecutors handle cases over intelligence officers' personal data and drones with Chinese chips Indictments in security cases linked to the Chinese side have followed one another in Taiwan this month. The Taoyuan District Prosecutors Office (臺灣桃園地方檢察署) announced on Oct. 6 that it had indicted retired air force captain Fei ○-hong (費○鋐) on espionage charges. According to prosecutors, Fei ○-hong was discharged in 1976 (Republic of China year 65) and in 2021 served as head of a township (鄉) in China's Hebei (河北) province. On the instructions of a man who introduced himself as "Gao Jinli (高金力)," Fei ○-hong in January 2024 collected the occupation, vehicle, actual residence and workplace of Taiwanese intelligence officer A1\. In the process, he had an unwitting private investigation firm look into A1's movements, workplace and vehicle records. His son Fei ○-xun (費○勛), who works at a real estate brokerage, is accused of using the company's system to look up all buildings registered in A1's name and handing over the results. Prosecutors said the information is designated as general official secrets. In July 2024, Fei ○-hong used the same method to collect the movements, workplace and vehicle records of another intelligence officer, A2. On Aug. 17, 2026, investigators obtained a court warrant, searched Fei ○-hong's home and took him in. The court granted the prosecutors' request and detained him incommunicado. Prosecutors charged Fei ○-hong under Article 30-1 of the National Intelligence Services Act (espionage), Article 7, Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the National Security Act and the Personal Data Protection Act, and charged his son only with violating the Personal Data Protection Act. The case was indicted for a trial with citizen participation under the Citizen Judges Act. The Taoyuan District Prosecutors Office announced on Oct. 12 that Jin○ Industrial (錦○實業), a company listed on the over-the-counter market (上櫃), and its subsidiary Ying○ International (英○國際) had violated contract rules while taking part in several drone procurement tenders for the armed forces. The two companies are accused of assembling Chinese-made chips and lenses, which were barred under the contracts, into the drones and submitting false certificates of origin at the inspection stage. Prosecutors believe company officials delivered the products knowing that the parts originated in the mainland area. On Oct. 8, the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau's Hsinchu County Field Station (新竹縣調查站), acting on court warrants, searched six locations, including the company, its subsidiary, supplier Taiwan Jie○si Technology (臺灣傑○斯科技) and the residences of related persons, and questioned seven suspects and employees and one witness. At about 3 a.m. on Oct. 9, the court approved the incommunicado detention of Jin○ Industrial vice chairman Jian ○-ting (簡○廷) and general manager of operations Chen ○-cheng (陳○澄). Prosecutors applied Article 11, Paragraph 1 and Article 12, Paragraph 1 of the National Security Act, Criminal Code provisions on making and using false entries in business documents, and the aggravated fraud provision for conspiracy by three or more people. Prosecutors said they obtained intelligence in advance and gathered evidence before conducting the searches. Taoyuan District Prosecutors Office chief prosecutor Zhang Chunhui (張春暉) treated the case as a priority and assigned it to a prosecutor dedicated to national security, and prosecutor Lin Yiwei (林奕瑋), who indicted the intelligence officers' personal data case on Oct. 6, led the investigation. Taiwanese prosecutors applied the National Security Act in all three cases, which dealt respectively with classified military documents, intelligence officers' personal data and parts for military-supplied equipment. ## South Korean law does not name China in its espionage provisions Taiwan's laws do not use the country name "China." Instead, they target China with the term "mainland area" (大陸地區). Article 2 of the National Security Act specifies the "mainland area" alongside foreign countries as parties to which leaking and spying are prohibited, and Articles 32 and 34 of the Classified National Security Information Protection Act also provide separately for the mainland area. In this case, the High Prosecutors Office treated the Chinese side that paid the defendants as this "mainland area" and applied the National Security Act. The summary of the indictment likewise refers to China as the "mainland area," in phrases such as "大陸地區之武力威脅" (the threat of force from the mainland area) and "大陸地區所新闢之管道" (a newly opened channel from the mainland area). Prosecutors also treated the same Chinese side as the "敵人" (enemy) under Article 20, Paragraph 2 of the Criminal Code of the Armed Forces and applied that provision, which carries death or life imprisonment, as well. The provision does not define "enemy," so it is up to the court to decide whether the Chinese side qualifies as one. The espionage offense in South Korea's Criminal Act long applied only to an "enemy state." Before its amendment, Article 98 of the Criminal Act punished anyone who spied for an enemy state or aided an enemy state's spy, and anyone who leaked military secrets to an enemy state, with death, life imprisonment or at least seven years in prison. A Criminal Act amendment bill submitted on July 31, 2024, by Rep. In Yo-han and 11 other lawmakers also stated in its rationale: "Current law punishes as espionage anyone who spies for an 'enemy state' or aids a spy, and anyone who leaks military secrets to an 'enemy state.'" In ruling 82Do2201 on Nov. 23, 1982, the Supreme Court said, "It is indeed as argued that the North Korean communist group is not an enemy state," but held that the espionage offense under the National Security Act is established when a person acting on the orders of an anti-state organization commits the offense in Article 98, Paragraph 1 of the Criminal Act. Passing secrets to foreign countries not connected with North Korea fell outside this framework. Such cases have been handled under the leak provisions of the Military Secret Protection Act and the Military Criminal Act. Article 12, Paragraph 1 of the Military Secret Protection Act punishes anyone who leaks military secrets they have spied on or collected with at least one year in prison, and Article 13, Paragraph 1 punishes a person who handles military secrets in the course of duty and leaks them with at least three years in prison. Article 15 provides that the sentence may be increased by up to half if such offenses are committed for a foreign country or foreigner (including a foreign organization). Article 80, Paragraph 1 of the Military Criminal Act punishes anyone who leaks military secrets with up to 10 years of imprisonment with or without labor. Article 13 of the Military Criminal Act prescribes the death penalty for leaking military secrets to the enemy, but only when the recipient is the "enemy." A Criminal Act amendment bill submitted on July 22, 2024, by Rep. Wi Sung-lac and 10 other lawmakers noted: "Under current law, the espionage offense applies only to acts for an 'enemy state,' so punishment for acts such as collecting national secrets for foreign countries that are not enemy states is limited." A bill submitted on Aug. 23 of the same year by Rep. Kim Gunn and nine other lawmakers stated: "As seen in the recent leak of the list of Defense Intelligence Command agents, there have been calls for the scope of an enemy state in the traditional sense to be expanded." In the 22nd National Assembly, similar bills followed one after another, including one submitted on June 21, 2024, by Rep. Joo Ho-young and nine other lawmakers. A subcommittee of the Legislation and Judiciary Committee voted on Nov. 13, 2024, to incorporate the bills into an alternative bill. The full Legislation and Judiciary Committee passed the amendment on Dec. 3, 2025, and the plenary session passed it on Feb. 26, 2026. The government promulgated the amended Criminal Act as Act No. 21450 on March 12\. The new Article 98-2 (espionage for foreign countries, etc.) punishes anyone who, for "a foreign country or an equivalent organization," spies on, collects, leaks, transmits or brokers national secrets, or aids in doing so, under its orders, instigation or other communication, with "imprisonment for a limited term of at least three years." Under its supplementary provisions, the amended Criminal Act took effect on Sept. 13, six months after promulgation. Article 98, Paragraph 1, covering espionage for an enemy state, retained "death, life imprisonment or at least seven years in prison." Article 102 provides that for offenses including those under Article 98, "a foreign country, etc. hostile to the Republic of Korea shall be deemed an enemy state." Espionage for a foreign country not deemed hostile (Article 98-2) carries no death penalty or life imprisonment, and its minimum sentence of three years is lower than the seven years for spying for an enemy state. Which countries are "foreign countries hostile to the Republic of Korea" is not specified by name in the law. The espionage provisions of the Military Criminal Act are still based on the "enemy." A Military Criminal Act amendment bill (No. 2202339) submitted on July 29, 2024, by Rep. Lim Jong-deuk and nine other lawmakers would create a basis for punishing espionage for foreign countries and leaks of military secrets to foreign countries as espionage. The bill was placed on the agenda of the full Legislation and Judiciary Committee on Nov. 4 of that year and sent to a subcommittee. South Korea's Criminal Act and Military Secret Protection Act contain no provision naming a specific country or region, as Taiwan's National Security Act does. The Lee Jae-myung government's response also remains within the same framework. The six tasks for responding to technology leaks drawn up by the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Resources at the 76th Industrial Technology Protection Committee meeting on Oct. 19 did not include the words "China" or "espionage." At the ministry's parliamentary audit on Oct. 6, there were calls to set criteria for applying the espionage offense to technology leak crimes, but they were not reflected in the tasks. The Ministry of Intellectual Property said in a February briefing that about 70% of overseas technology leaks went to China. On the day Taiwanese prosecutors applied a death-or-life-imprisonment provision to defendants who passed secrets to China, the South Korean government's measures left out the name of the counterpart country. ## Investigation Bureau tracks underground inflows of Chinese money ahead of local elections Taiwan this year holds local elections in which nine categories of local offices are elected at once (九合一選舉). On Sept. 8, the Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau announced the results of investigations tracking illicit funds targeting the 2026 (Republic of China year 115) public office elections. Conducted in parallel with dedicated investigations by the High Prosecutors Office, the investigations focused on inflows of Chinese money through underground channels, accounts on the e-commerce platform Shopee (蝦皮) borrowed under others' names by Chinese companies, money laundering rings set up by Hong Kong nationals, and the bringing in of overseas funds through fake businesses with no actual transactions. The Investigation Bureau mobilized 24 field units nationwide to investigate 54 cases. It searched 202 locations and questioned 559 people; 25 were detained and 70 released on bail. Illicit funds were tallied at NT$62,869.71 million. Of this, underground money exchange accounted for NT$11,186.29 million and rings laundering fraud and gambling money (水房) for NT$42,365.60 million, the latter type alone making up about two-thirds of the total. Seized criminal proceeds were worth NT$1,763.18 million and included 521 illegal bank accounts, 2,184 units of the stablecoin Tether (USDT) and 35 properties. The bureau warned candidates and citizens: "切勿透過地下通匯或各類洗錢管道，收受或協助移轉中資、外資進到國內" (do not receive, or help move into the country, Chinese or foreign funds through underground remittance or any money laundering channels). Shen You-chung (沈有忠), deputy minister of the Mainland Affairs Council, which handles the Taiwanese government's China policy, cited Chinese Communist Party united front infiltration, political propaganda, gray-zone operations and information manipulation at an academic conference on Oct. 17\. The council titled the press release introducing the remarks "威權的中共無權干預民主台灣的人民抉擇" (the authoritarian CCP has no right to interfere in the choices of the people of democratic Taiwan). "我們願意交流，但不會接受矮化" (we are willing to engage in exchanges, but will not accept being belittled), Shen said. The council said this year marks 30 years since direct presidential elections began in 1996, and that there have been eight direct presidential elections and three transfers of power since then. It also said about 80% of respondents support the status quo that "the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are not subordinate to each other." ## Sources (KST) - Taiwan High Prosecutors Office · 2026-10-19 · 《新聞稿115.10.19》本署偵結李姓被告等4人違反陸海空軍刑法等案，起訴請求從量重刑，嚴辦重懲維護國家安全 · https://www.tph.moj.gov.tw/4421/4509/4515/1450927/post - Taiwan High Prosecutors Office · 2026-10-19 · 新聞稿 (attached PDF) · https://www.tph.moj.gov.tw/media/457275/新聞稿.pdf?mediaDL=true - Taiwan Taoyuan District Prosecutors Office · 2026-10-06 · 1151006桃檢偵結起訴刺探洩漏情報人員資訊案件新聞稿 · https://www.tyc.moj.gov.tw/294079/294166/294168/1446152/post - Taiwan Taoyuan District Prosecutors Office · 2026-10-12 · 1151012桃檢偵辦某上櫃公司以陸製零件無人機供軍購案新聞稿 · https://www.tyc.moj.gov.tw/294079/294166/294168/1448120/post - 陸海空軍刑法 Articles 20 and 22 (amended version promulgated 2023-12-27) · Taiwan Ministry of Justice Laws & Regulations Database · https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=F0060002 - 國家安全法 Articles 2 and 7 (amended version promulgated 2022-06-08) · Taiwan Ministry of Justice Laws & Regulations Database · https://law.moj.gov.tw/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?pcode=A0030028 - 貪污治罪條例 Articles 4 and 11 · Taipei City Laws and Regulations Database, accessed 2026-10-20 · https://laws.gov.taipei/law/LawSearch/LawPrint/FL001430?type=0 - Ministry of Justice Investigation Bureau · 2026-09-08 15:15 KST · 調查局打擊不法金流，守護民主選舉！全力防堵境外不法資金介選及干擾選舉 · https://www.mjib.gov.tw/news/Details/1/1209 - Mainland Affairs Council · 2026-10-17 · 陸委會沈副主委強調威權的中共無權干預民主台灣的人民抉擇，政府將持續深化民主韌性，堅定捍衛自由民主與台海和平穩定現狀 · https://www.mac.gov.tw/News\_Content.aspx?n=05B73310C5C3A632&sms=1A40B00E4C745211&s=FB1B0FB3F231AB5F - South Korean Ministry of Justice · 2026-03-12 · 「형법」 일부개정법률 공포·시행 알림 · https://www.moj.go.kr/bbs/moj/159/604279/artclView.do - South Korean Ministry of Justice · 2026-03-12 · 법률제21450호(형법 일부개정법률).pdf (attachment to promulgation notice) · https://www.immigration.go.kr/bbs/moj/159/491851/download.do - Supreme Court of Korea · 1982-11-23 · ruling 82도2201 (espionage, violation of the former National Security Act, violation of the Anti-Communism Act, violation of the National Security Act) · https://www.nepla.ai/case/대법원/82도2201 - Military Secret Protection Act Articles 12, 13 and 15 (Act No. 22012, effective 2026-10-02) · Korea Law Information Center · https://www.law.go.kr/LSW/lsInfoP.do?lsNm=군사기밀+보호법 - Military Criminal Act Articles 13 and 80 (Act No. 18465, effective 2022-07-01) · Korea Law Information Center · https://www.law.go.kr/LSW/lsInfoP.do?lsNm=군형법 - National Assembly bill No. 2202119 · submitted 2024-07-22 · Criminal Act partial amendment bill (Rep. Wi Sung-lac and 10 others) · Ministry of Government Legislation National Participatory Legislation Center, National Assembly legislation status · https://opinion.lawmaking.go.kr/gcom/nsmLmSts/out/2202119/detailRP - National Assembly bill No. 2202437 · submitted 2024-07-31 · Criminal Act partial amendment bill (Rep. In Yo-han and 11 others) · Ministry of Government Legislation National Participatory Legislation Center, National Assembly legislation status · https://opinion.lawmaking.go.kr/gcom/nsmLmSts/out/2202437/detailRP - National Assembly bill No. 2203154 · submitted 2024-08-23 · Criminal Act partial amendment bill (Rep. Kim Gunn and 9 others) · Ministry of Government Legislation National Participatory Legislation Center, National Assembly legislation status · https://opinion.lawmaking.go.kr/gcom/nsmLmSts/out/2203154/detailRP - National Assembly bill No. 2200774 · submitted 2024-06-21 · Criminal Act partial amendment bill (Rep. 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