China's foreign ministry, asked about Japan's yttrium running out: aim is to thwart remilitarization and nuclear weapons bid

INDO-PACIFIC

China's foreign ministry said at an official briefing that the purpose of its export controls targeting Japan is to thwart Japan's remilitarization and attempt to possess nuclear weapons. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning, asked at a regular briefing in Beijing on the 21st (local time) about the possibility that Japan's stocks of the key rare earth yttrium could run out within months, replied, "China implements export controls on Japan in accordance with the laws and regulations." Mao went on to say, "The aim is to thwart Japan's remilitarization and attempt to possess nuclear weapons."

Foreign reporter asks, citing report that Japan sought U.S. help

According to the English-language transcript of the briefing released by the Chinese foreign ministry, the question came from a foreign reporter. Citing overseas reports from the previous day, the reporter said Japan had only months left before its supply of yttrium, a key rare earth, ran out, and that it had asked the United States for help in encouraging China to ease the relevant export controls. The reporter then asked for the ministry's position.

Mao's answer consisted of four sentences. The first two set out the export controls on Japan in accordance with the law and their purpose. In the last two, Mao added, "China's position of keeping the global industrial and supply chains of critical minerals safe and stable has not changed," and "All parties have the responsibility to play a constructive role to this end."

Mao did not disclose the size of Japan's yttrium stocks, the number of export licenses granted for Japan or the conditions for lifting the controls. Mao also did not separately address the part about Japan asking the United States for help. This exchange was the only point in the briefing where Japan was mentioned, and there were no follow-up questions. The rest of the briefing was taken up with Foreign Minister Wang Yi's attendance at the opening ceremony of the Xiong'an Global Governance Forum on the 23rd, Premier Li Qiang's attendance at the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Council of Heads of Government meeting in Tajikistan, and issues concerning Ukraine and Cuba, among others.

Yttrium cannot leave China without a Commerce Ministry license since April 2025

Yttrium is one of seven medium and heavy rare earths that China made subject to export licensing on April 4, 2025. That day, China's Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs issued "Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs Announcement No. 18 of 2025," placing items related to samarium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium under export control. The announcement said the controls were being implemented "with the approval of the State Council, in order to safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international obligations such as non-proliferation," and they took effect on the day of the announcement.

The yttrium items were grouped under control number 1C908. 1C908.a covers yttrium metal and yttrium-aluminum, -magnesium, -nickel, -copper and -iron alloys, yttrium targets, yttrium-aluminum alloy targets and yttrium-zirconium alloy targets. 1C908.b covers yttrium oxide and its mixtures, and 1C908.c covers compounds containing yttrium and their mixtures. Reference customs commodity codes for each item were attached to the announcement. Yttrium oxide and its mixtures were assigned three commodity codes, and yttrium compounds and their mixtures nine. The legal bases of the announcement are the Export Control Law, the Foreign Trade Law, the Customs Law and the Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items.

The Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), introducing the measure on April 7 of that year, said exporters wishing to ship the items must apply to the Ministry of Commerce for a license under China's Export Control Law and the Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items. Customs declarations must state whether goods are controlled items and give the control number, and if customs has doubts about the entries it requests an explanation and does not permit clearance in the meantime. According to JETRO, China's Ministry of Commerce explained at the time that these items "have dual civilian and military attributes, and implementing export controls on them is a global standard."

A JETRO report released on March 10, 2026, cited phosphor materials, YAG lasers and thin-film capacitors as uses of yttrium. The same report said Japanese companies were hit hardest by the April 2025 measures, analyzing that samarium, dysprosium and terbium, used in permanent magnets, caused heavy damage across automobiles, industrial machinery and electronics. China's rare earth magnet exports to Japan fell sharply in April-May 2025, hitting 25.7 tons in May, the lowest level in recent years. From July onward they largely recovered to the monthly levels of the previous two years, but licenses often took more than three months from application.

China's Commerce Ministry bans all exports of dual-use items for Japanese military use on January 6

China's Ministry of Commerce announced on January 6, 2026, measures tightening export controls on dual-use items to Japan. According to the spokesperson's remarks posted on the ministry's English-language website, China, under the Export Control Law and the Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items, banned exports of all dual-use items to Japanese military users and military uses, and to all other end users and uses that could contribute to enhancing Japan's military capabilities. It also said it would pursue legal liability against organizations or individuals in other countries or regions that violate this by transferring Chinese-origin dual-use items to Japanese parties. JETRO said that as of January 7, no definition of "all other end users and uses contributing to the enhancement of Japan's military capabilities" had been issued, leaving the scope of the regulations unclear.

The Chinese Ministry of Commerce spokesperson cited a Japanese leader's remarks on Taiwan as the reason for the measure. According to the spokesperson's remarks posted on the ministry's English-language website, the ministry claimed that "the Japanese leader has blatantly made erroneous remarks on China's Taiwan region," "hinting at the possibility of armed intervention in the Taiwan Strait." It went on to characterize this as "gross interference in China's internal affairs" and a serious violation of the one-China principle. The January statement mentioned non-proliferation obligations but did not use the words remilitarization or nuclear weapons.

In February and June, Japanese companies and institutions are listed in four batches of 20

China's Ministry of Commerce issued two announcements at once on February 24. "Announcement No. 11 of 2026" placed 20 Japanese entities "participating in the enhancement of Japan's military capabilities," including Mitsubishi Shipbuilding, on the export control list. Counting the entries in the list's annex one by one, there are five Mitsubishi Heavy Industries affiliates, two Kawasaki Heavy Industries affiliates, one Fujitsu affiliate, six IHI affiliates, two NEC affiliates and two Japan Marine United (JMU) affiliates, plus the National Defense Academy and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), for a total of 20. The announcement banned exports of dual-use items to them and also barred overseas organizations and individuals from transferring Chinese-origin dual-use items to them. It stipulated that ongoing transactions "must be stopped immediately." If exports are necessary due to special circumstances, exporters must apply separately to the Ministry of Commerce. The announcement cited the Export Control Law and the Regulations on the Export Control of Dual-Use Items as its basis, and said the entities were being listed "in order to safeguard national security and interests and fulfill international obligations such as non-proliferation." The announcement did not include a procedure for removal from the list.

"Announcement No. 12 of 2026," issued the same day, placed 20 entities, including Subaru, "whose end users and end uses of dual-use items cannot be verified" on the watch list. They include Mitsubishi Materials, TDK, Sumitomo Heavy Industries, Hino Motors, Nitto Denko and ENEOS. Exports to them cannot use general licenses and require individual licenses, along with a risk assessment report and a written commitment "not to use them for any purpose that helps enhance Japan's military capabilities." The license review period is not subject to the time limits set by the regulations. The announcement said exports related to Japanese military users and uses "will not be approved." Entities on the watch list may apply for removal if they cooperate with the authorities' verification investigations under Article 26 of the regulations, and may be removed after confirmation by the Ministry of Commerce.

On June 29, the Ministry of Commerce in the same way added 20 entities, including Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, to the export control list and 20 entities, including Mitsui E&S, to the watch list. According to the spokesperson's statement, entities on the export control list must immediately stop related ongoing activities, and export license applications for watch-list entities require a risk assessment report and a written commitment not to use the items for military purposes.

Commerce Ministry cites curbing remilitarization and nuclear weapons possession as aim in June

In remarks released on June 29, the Ministry of Commerce spokesperson again explained the purpose of the February measures. The statement said the listing of 40 entities on February 24 was "to curb Japan's attempts at 'remilitarization' and possession of nuclear weapons." It went on to claim that, regrettably, rather than reflecting on and correcting its mistakes, the Japanese side had gone further down the wrong path, accelerating neo-militarism and remilitarization, deploying offensive weapons and launching offensive missiles overseas.

The same statement also contained language meant to reassure Japanese companies. The ministry said the measure "will not affect normal economic and trade exchanges between China and Japan." It also said the lists target only a small number of Japanese entities, that the related measures apply only to dual-use items, and that Japanese entities operating in good faith and abiding by the law have nothing to worry about. Rare earths and yttrium are not mentioned even once in the statement.

At the foreign ministry briefing on the 21st, the same purpose was given in answer to a question about Japan's yttrium supply shortage. When it announced the yttrium controls in April 2025, the Ministry of Commerce cited national security, non-proliferation obligations and a "global standard" as grounds and did not name any particular country.

Spokesperson Lin Jian lists Japan's defense spending and missiles in February as evidence of remilitarization

China's foreign ministry has repeatedly taken issue with Japan's remilitarization this year. At a regular briefing on February 3, spokesperson Lin Jian said China and Russia "are highly aligned in their positions on the Japan issue," and that "Japan's accelerating 'remilitarization' threatens regional peace and stability." As evidence, Lin claimed that Japan's defense budget had risen for 14 consecutive years to reach $58 billion, that its growth over the past five years exceeded 60%, and that defense spending had reached 2% of gross domestic product (GDP). Lin also cited the conversion of destroyers into "aircraft carriers," the development and purchase of medium- and long-range missiles with ranges exceeding 1,000 km, and the first re-export of "Patriot" missiles and export of destroyers in 2025. Lin also said Japanese government officials were openly discussing "possessing nuclear weapons" and seeking to revise the "Three Non-Nuclear Principles." Lin further claimed that the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender set out Japan's international obligations, and that Japan's constitution strictly restricts military forces and the right of belligerency. Lin also argued that 14 Class-A war criminals are enshrined at Yasukuni Shrine and that Japanese right-wing forces are trying to whitewash the history of aggression by revising history textbooks. Lin also said Japan is building a cross-domain operational system spanning land, sea, air, space, cyber and electromagnetic domains. Lin said, "China should join hands with all peace-loving countries to curb the 'remilitarization' ambitions of Japan's right-wing forces."

At the same briefing, a reporter from a Japanese broadcaster said Japan had mined rare-earth-rich mud the previous day and asked for comment on Japan's efforts to reduce its dependence on China for rare earths. Lin only replied, "We have noted that there have been such reports in Japan in recent years." In response to a separate question about U.S. plans to stockpile critical minerals, Lin said, "China's position on maintaining the stability and security of global industrial and supply chains of critical minerals has not changed." This sentence from Lin is almost identical to the latter part of the answer Mao gave to the yttrium question more than eight months later.

Suspension of China's October rare earth measures expires November 10

The April 2025 controls, including yttrium, remain in force. On October 9, 2025, China announced additional controls covering superhard materials, rare earth equipment and raw materials, additional medium and heavy rare earth items, lithium batteries and graphite anode materials, rare earth items produced overseas, and rare earth technologies. On November 7, the Ministry of Commerce and the General Administration of Customs issued "Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs Announcement No. 70 of 2025," suspending "from the date of issue until November 10, 2026" the implementation of six announcements in total: Ministry of Commerce and General Administration of Customs Announcements Nos. 55-58 of 2025 and Ministry of Commerce Announcements Nos. 61 and 62. The announcement does not state the reason for the suspension. JETRO described the suspension as a measure based on a U.S.-China agreement. JETRO said the controls on seven medium and heavy rare earths announced on April 4 "continue to be implemented." Around the same time, on November 10, 2025, China's Ministry of Commerce also suspended for one year, by "Ministry of Commerce Order No. 7 of 2025," countermeasures against five U.S.-related subsidiaries of Hanwha Ocean. JETRO's March 2026 report said that after General Administration of Customs Announcement No. 123 of June 16, 2025, customs inspections were tightened, with many cases taking from several weeks to about a month, and even magnets not containing the seven rare earths were affected inconsistently from one customs office to another.

Less than three weeks remain until the November 10 suspension deadline. At the briefing on the 21st, Mao did not mention whether the suspension would be extended or how it relates to the controls on Japan. At the same briefing, in response to a question about a U.S.-China-Russia trilateral summit, Mao said there was "no information to provide at the moment."

Sources (KST)

• Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-10-21 · Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Mao Ning's Regular Press Conference on October 21, 2026 · https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/xw/fyrbt/lxjzh/202610/t20261021_12044543.html
• Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-02-03 · 2026年2月3日外交部发言人林剑主持例行记者会 · https://www.mfa.gov.cn/web/wjdt_674879/fyrbt_674889/202602/t20260203_11850245.shtml
• Chinese Ministry of Commerce · 2026-02-24 · 商务部公告2026年第11号 公布将20家日本实体列入出口管制管控名单 · https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zcfb/zc/art/2026/art_a73f2b59e13d4454b0f58618917f3944.html
• Chinese Ministry of Commerce · 2026-02-24 · 商务部公告2026年第12号 公布将20家日本实体列入关注名单 · https://www.mofcom.gov.cn/zwgk/zcfb/art/2026/art_bac18400512d408a8d4c2f964e36ac11.html
• Chinese Ministry of Commerce · 2026-01 · MOFCOM Spokesperson's Remarks on Tightening Controls on Dual-Use Items Exports to Japan · https://english.mofcom.gov.cn/News/SpokesmansRemarks/art/2026/art_ad432d69b63545ef81b6b0c9d21c0fa1.html
• Chinese Ministry of Commerce · 2026-06-29 released (posted 2026-07-07) · MOFCOM Spokesperson's Remarks on Relevant Export Control Measures Targeting Japan · https://english.mofcom.gov.cn/News/SpokesmansRemarks/art/2026/art_8a8c97213a8341b5b1c43cab9d26dc72.html
• Hong Kong Trade and Industry Department trade circular attachment · 2025-04-04 · 商务部 海关总署公告2025年第18号 · https://www.tid.gov.hk/en/tradecircular/files/2025/ci2025318a.pdf
• Hong Kong Trade and Industry Department trade circular attachment · 2025-11-07 · 商务部 海关总署公告2025年第70号 · https://www.tid.gov.hk/en/tradecircular/files/2025/ci9772025a.pdf
• Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) · 2026-01-08 · 中国、デュアルユース品目の対日輸出管理を強化 · https://www.jetro.go.jp/biznews/2026/01/daa0760fd28a2226.html
• Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) · 2025-04-07 · 中国、中・重希土類7種のレアアース関連品目で4月4日から輸出管理を実施 · https://www.jetro.go.jp/biznews/2025/04/9008601e0d63d27d.html
• Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) · 2025-11-11 · 中国、米中合意に基づき、10月9日発表のレアアース輸出管理関連措置などを1年間暫定停止 · https://www.jetro.go.jp/biznews/2025/11/2b5f90cf2b7bf163.html
• Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) · 2026-03-10 · 中国のレアアース輸出管理（1）日本への磁石輸出に大きな影響 · https://www.jetro.go.jp/biz/areareports/special/2026/0101/5229e687b7a111eb.html