China's foreign ministry says 'no gray area on Taiwan question,' pushes back on Philippines-Taiwan undersea cable cooperation

INDO-PACIFIC

China's foreign ministry has publicly pushed back on cooperation between the Philippines and Taiwan on protecting undersea cables. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning (毛宁), at a regular briefing in Beijing on the 22nd (local time), responded to the Philippines' statement that it would explore cooperation with Taiwan on protecting undersea cables and countering gray-zone activities while maintaining its one-China policy by saying "there is no gray area on the Taiwan question" ("在台湾问题上没有灰色地带"). Mao went on to demand that "the Philippines should abide by the one-China principle with concrete actions" ("菲方应当以实际行动恪守一个中国原则"). China thus treated Philippines-Taiwan undersea cable cooperation as a matter of the one-China principle.

Mao Ning answers in three sentences, demanding 'concrete actions' from the Philippines

The question came from a Reuters reporter. The reporter said "the Philippines said yesterday that, despite pursuing a one-China policy, it will still explore deepening cooperation with Taiwan to protect undersea cables and counter gray-zone activities" ("菲律宾昨天表示，尽管奉行一个中国政策，菲仍将探索同台湾深化合作，以保护海缆和应对灰色地带活动"). The reporter also asked whether China considers such cooperation a violation of the one-China principle.

Mao's answer was three sentences long. The first sentence was "there is no gray area on the Taiwan question," and the second was the demand that the Philippines abide by the one-China principle through action. The third sentence was "the external exchanges of China's Taiwan region should be handled strictly in accordance with the one-China principle" ("中国台湾地区开展对外交往应当严格按照一个中国原则处理"). Mao did not answer "yes" or "no" to the question of whether the cooperation violates the principle, and did not mention undersea cables in the answer.

According to the briefing transcript released by the ministry that day, this exchange was preceded by questions about the 31st regular meeting between the Chinese and Russian heads of government held in St. Petersburg, the possibility of a China-U.S.-Russia summit, the European Union's (EU) Arctic strategy, and a joint press communique by the foreign ministers of China and Djibouti. The transcript of the briefing the next day, the 23rd, contained no exchanges on the Philippines or Taiwan. The questions at the 23rd briefing covered three topics: German President Steinmeier's visit to China, the 55th anniversary of the restoration of China's lawful seat at the United Nations, and a U.S. Treasury Department plan to designate biotechnology as a sector subject to outbound investment prohibitions.

Chinese foreign ministry also repeatedly took issue with Philippine words and actions on Taiwan last August

This is not the first time China's foreign ministry has targeted Philippine words and actions related to Taiwan. On August 8, 2025, the ministry posted a separate answer on "remarks by the Philippine leader concerning Taiwan." The question at the time said the Philippine leader had said in an interview during a visit to India that "if a full-scale war breaks out (in the Taiwan Strait), the Philippines will inevitably be drawn into it" ("如（台海）发生全面战争，菲律宾势必会被卷入其中"). The Philippine leader was also quoted in the question as saying that if China and the United States confronted each other over Taiwan, the Philippines could not stay out because of its geographic location. The remarks quoted in the question also included a statement that, because many Filipinos are in Taiwan, the Philippines would mobilize all resources to evacuate them if war broke out.

In response, the ministry's spokesperson called the Taiwan question "the core of China's core interests" ("中方核心利益中的核心"). The spokesperson claimed that the Philippine government had previously promised to "adhere to the one-China policy and recognize that Taiwan is an inalienable part of China's territory" ("坚持一个中国政策，承认台湾是中国领土不可分割的一部分") and to understand the Chinese government's efforts toward national reunification. The spokesperson said "'geographic proximity' and 'large numbers of nationals' are not excuses for one country to interfere in another's internal affairs and meddle in matters of another's sovereignty" ("'地理邻近''侨民众多'不是一国干涉他国内政和染指他国主权事务的借口"), adding that the ministry and the Chinese Embassy in the Philippines had lodged stern representations with the Philippines. The spokesperson also claimed the Philippine leader had once told China that "the Philippines firmly pursues the one-China policy, and the Taiwan question is purely China's internal affair that must be resolved by the Chinese themselves" ("菲律宾坚定奉行一个中国政策，台湾问题纯属中国内政，必须由中国人自己解决"). The spokesperson said the Philippine remarks violated international law and the ASEAN Charter.

On the 29th of the same month, the ministry took issue with a visit to the Philippines by Lin Chia-lung (林佳龙), then Taiwan's foreign minister. The ministry's spokesperson accused the Philippines of turning a blind eye as Lin made a visit "in the capacity of the head of a so-called foundation" ("以所谓基金会负责人身份窜访") and of "continuously hollowing out the one-China principle" ("持续虚化掏空一个中国原则"). The spokesperson demanded that the Philippines "rein in at the brink of the precipice and mend its ways" ("悬崖勒马、改邪归正"). The spokesperson said stern representations and strong protests had been lodged with the Philippines in Beijing and Manila. The spokesperson warned that "the Philippines' acts of trampling on China's red line will surely come at a price" ("菲方踩踏中方红线的行为必将付出代价").

China steps up pressure this year by sanctioning the Philippine defense secretary

The pressure led to sanctions this year. According to Taiwan's foreign ministry, Philippine Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro (鐵歐多洛) said at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore on May 30 that, in the face of China's expanding military influence and coercion, the Philippines was strengthening its security relationship with the United States while also seeking exchanges and cooperation with defense partners such as Japan, Vietnam and Taiwan. Taiwan's foreign ministry welcomed this in Press Release No. 246 on June 1. Taiwan's foreign ministry said "our country is willing to work with the Philippines and like-minded countries to jointly promote democracy, peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region" ("我國願與菲國及理念相近國家共同促進印太地區的民主、和平與繁榮") and referred to pursuing a "Taiwan-Philippines Economic Corridor." Taiwan's foreign ministry said it also welcomed the launch of supply chain cooperation between the Philippines and the United States under the "Pax Silica" (矽盛世) initiative.

At its briefing the next day, June 2, China's foreign ministry said of Teodoro that "this Philippine defense secretary has repeatedly made absurd remarks concerning China" ("这位菲律宾防长多次发表涉华谬论"). Mao said Philippine leaders had repeatedly expressed a willingness to properly handle differences with China and ease relations, adding: "we hope the Philippines will match its words with deeds and strictly restrain the words and actions of its officials" ("希望菲方言行一致，严格约束官员言行"). The question in that exchange said Teodoro had described Chinese fertilizer and fuel aid at the Shangri-La Dialogue as packaging without long-term sincerity and as deception. According to the question, Teodoro also said the aid could not change the Philippine view of China and that the Philippines faced serious territorial and political threats from China. On June 11, China's foreign ministry announced that it was banning Teodoro and Teodoro's spouse and children from entering mainland China, Hong Kong and Macao, and prohibiting organizations and individuals in China from dealing or cooperating with them. As the reason for the sanctions, the ministry said Teodoro had "repeatedly made absurd remarks concerning China, harmed China's legitimate interests and undermined China-Philippines relations" ("多次发表涉华谬论，损害中方正当利益，破坏中菲两国关系").

China and Taiwan also clash over Japan-Philippines maritime boundary talks

Maritime boundary issues also emerged around the same time. According to Taiwan's foreign ministry, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi and Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., in a joint statement after their summit in Tokyo on May 28, stressed the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and urged "the peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues through dialogue" ("對話和平解決兩岸問題"). Taiwan's foreign ministry said it was the first time the two leaders had expressed strong interest in the Taiwan Strait issue through a joint statement. Japan and the Philippines also launched negotiations on delimiting their exclusive economic zone (EEZ) boundary.

At its June 2 briefing, China's foreign ministry said "the sea area where Japan and the Philippines intend to discuss delimitation lies east of China's Taiwan island" ("此次日菲拟探讨划界的海域位于中国台湾岛以东"). The ministry said the two countries' launch of negotiations while bypassing China was a serious violation of international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and an infringement of China's maritime rights and interests, and that "China will never allow it" ("中方决不允许"). Taiwan's foreign ministry said on June 3 that the area under negotiation overlapped substantially with Taiwan's eastern EEZ and asked the two countries to consult with Taiwan. Taiwan's foreign ministry said it had instructed its representative offices in Japan and the Philippines to confirm the content of the negotiations with the two governments. Taiwan's foreign ministry countered that "China has no right to comment on Taiwan's policies or position" and criticized China for abusing the one-China principle and using "maritime law enforcement" to project military power.

Philippine coast guard says it blocked Chinese research vessel off Batanes

Earlier this month, a Chinese research vessel and the Philippine Coast Guard faced off off Batanes in the Philippines. Jay Tarriela, the Philippine Coast Guard spokesperson for the West Philippine Sea, said on X on October 1 that the coast guard had "successfully disrupted" the "unauthorized marine scientific research (MSR)" of a Chinese research vessel off Batanes. In the post, Tarriela claimed there had been "shielding" by the China Coast Guard.

The record of spokesperson Guo Jiakun's answers on October 3 and the transcript of the October 8 briefing by China's foreign ministry contained no exchanges on the Philippines, the research vessel or Batanes.

Report posted by U.S. congressional commission names Taiwan, Japan and Philippines cables as 'risk hot spots'

The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), established by the U.S. Congress, last month posted on its website a report titled "China's Gray Zone Threats to Trans-Pacific Undersea Cables." The report was prepared by the private research institute China Strategic Risks Institute (CSRI) under contract with the commission's research working group. The report states that its publication "does not necessarily imply an endorsement by the Commission."

After assessing 32 U.S. trans-Pacific undersea cables, including eight not yet in operation, the report concluded that "Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines emerge as risk hot spots." The report cited China's domestically built 10,000-meter-class deep-sea submersible "Fendouzhe" (奋斗者). It also said a patent had been issued for a deep-sea cable robot that moves along cables, and that a research center under China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) was reported in 2025 to have developed a 4,000-meter-class deep-sea electric cable-cutting device. Four of the top 10 highest-risk cables (E2A, TPU, ORCA and ACC-1) are still under development and scheduled to open between 2026 and 2029. The report analyzed six cases of deliberate undersea cable damage suspected of being linked to China between 2021 and 2025. Of these, the only cable with partial Chinese ownership was the TPE cable cut in the East China Sea in January 2025. TPE is jointly owned by China Telecom and China Unicom together with U.S., Japanese, South Korean and Taiwanese operators. The report stated: "Cables landing in Taiwan thus have a significantly heightened risk of being targeted."

On the Philippines, the report found that "with only three direct connections to the United States, any one cut could have a significant impact." It also included a calculation that, in a scenario in which all four cables linking Taiwan and the United States (FASTER, NCP, PLCN and TPE) were cut, spare capacity at peak demand would be 1.76%, less than 2%. The report also examined repair conditions. There are 62 cable ships worldwide, of which at most 36 can be deployed for repair and maintenance at any one time, and repairs in the Asia-Pacific take about 30 days on average, longer than in North America and the Atlantic. The report noted that China has required repair ships to obtain work permits in waters over which it claims jurisdiction, and that repairs have been particularly difficult in the South China Sea.

Report recommends maritime surveillance platform including South Korea, Taiwan and the Philippines

In its recommendations to the U.S. Congress, the report put joint action by allies and partners first. It recommended building "a combined MDA platform with Indo-Pacific partners including Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Australia." Around high-risk cables, it called for expanding joint navy and coast guard patrols using both crewed and uncrewed systems, modeled on "Baltic Sentry," the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) surveillance operation in the Baltic Sea.

The recommendations also include expediting Foreign Military Sales (FMS) to Taiwan and allocating Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds, negotiating joint procedures through regional groupings such as the Quad to rapidly track, intercept and detain vessels suspected of damaging cables, and designating and enforcing, together with partner countries, protected zones that restrict or ban fishing, trawling and anchoring. The report recommended jointly financing at least five additional repair ships in the Indo-Pacific by 2040, agreeing with allies on standing permits for emergency repairs, and jointly investing in routes that bypass Chinese-controlled landing points. It also proposed making sensing technologies such as distributed acoustic sensing (DAS) mandatory as a condition of cable landing licenses for new projects in high-risk waters, and creating a two-way threat information-sharing system with trusted cable operators.

The undersea cable protection and gray-zone response cooperation that the Philippines said it would explore with Taiwan overlaps with the joint response direction set out in the report. China's foreign ministry on the 22nd treated this cooperation as a matter of the one-China principle.

Sources (KST)

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